An agentic security stack that captures security and privacy risks, requirements and functionality boundaries, translates task requirements into formal specifications, selects or generates suitable cryptographic protocols (e.g. secure comms, MPC, ZK), and verifies their properties with Lean, ProVerif and similar tools. The goal is an end-to-end workflow in which agents, from orchestrators to sub-agents, can negotiate security needs and connect verified protocol descriptions to executable multi-agent interactions.

Team: Myrto Arapinis, Jianyi Cheng, Michele Ciampi, Wenda Li (University of Edinburgh)

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

An automated mechanism and protocol design engine. Agents specify desired properties, such as incentive compatibility, safety and liveness, and Dovetail designs an interaction protocol and proves in Lean that it satisfies those requirements. The team will also manage a cross-team repository of protocols, with the goal of speeding up automated protocol generation.

Team: Emanuele La Malfa, Angelo Huang (Institute for Decentralized AI); Mirco Giacobbe, Gabriel Santos (Zeroth Research)

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

ProtoSage is an agentic system for auditing cryptographic protocols, supported by ProtoBench’s corpus and evaluation tasks. The project builds on OpenSage and WireWatch to identify vulnerabilities, recover protocol specifications, and eventually produce machine-checkable models that experts and formal-verification tools can inspect.

Team: Mona Wang (RDI Foundation)

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

CCTI is also the programme’s integration partner, mapping how Creators’ work fits together, co-developing shared building blocks with interested teams, and proposing open-source benchmarks and challenges to the Arena.

Team: grjte (Ink & Switch); Hossein Hafezi, Alireza Kavousi, Arman Kolozyan, Jessica Man (University of Cambridge); Jonathan Heiß, Ágnes Kiss, Aurel Stenzel (SINE); Daniel Hugenroth, Mario Lins (Light Squares)

Outputs

• Announcing the Centre for Cryptographic Trust Infrastructure (CCTI) — Martin Kleppmann’s announcement: the supplier-verification problem CCTI starts from, and how attested facts can feed zero-knowledge proofs about physical production processes (7 October 2026).

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

A tamper-resistant physical watermarking framework to verify the provenance and safety compliance of control policies driving embodied robots. By extending the Colored Noise Coherency (CoNoCo) construction, it lets independent parties remotely authenticate active controllers using commodity hardware, such as standard CCTV cameras or smartphones, without direct access to the robot or specialised sensing equipment.

Team: Manon Flageat, Mateusz Sypniewski, Sally Matthews (University of Cambridge)

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.

Team: Kate Lucas, Ciara Gumsheimer, Ollie Rosen (Matta)

Outputs

Repositories, papers, and demos will be linked here as the work gets underway.